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IMPLICATIONS  OF  THE ILLINOIS REEMPLOYMENT BONUS  EXPERIMENTS 
FOR THEORIES OF  UNENPLOYNENT  AND POLICY  DESION 
ABSTRACT 
Reemployment bonus  experiments  offer large lump sum payments  to 
unemployment  insurance  (UI)  recipients  who find a job quickly.  Such 
experiments  are underway  or have  been  recently completed  in  four states.  This 
paper  analyzes  the results from  Illinois and discusses the implications of the 
experiments  for theories  of unemployment  and policy  design.  I examine the 
hazard  rate of exit from unemployment  and find that it is significantly higher 
for the experimental  groups, but only during  the period  of  bonus  eligibility. 
Both labor supply  and search theories of  unemployment  are shown to suggest a 
rise in  the reemployment hazard  just before  the end of  bonus eligibility  and 
to suggest  larger effects of  the fixed amount bonus for lower income  groups. 
Only weak support is found mr these hypotheses, which  suggests  limitotious  of 
the models of  unemployment.  Some modifications of the models  are suggested. 
The experiments  demonstrate  the effects of economic incentives  on  job 
finding behavior but they do  not show the desirability of a permanent 
reemployment  bonus program.  Evidence  from another sample  suggests that as 
many as half  of  those who received a reemployment bonus  returned to their 
previous  employer,  so that a bonus program that pays people  returning  to their 
last employer would  provide  a strong encouragement  to temporary  layoffs.  A 
discussion  of UI claim filing behavior  suggests that a permanent  program could 
well increase  the frequency  or promptness  of filing, thus reducing any 
financial  advantages  of a bonus program. 
Bruce D. Meyer 
Northwestern University 
Department  of  Economics 
2003 Sheridan Road 
Evanston, IL  60201 1.  Introduction 
Reemployment  bonus  experiments  ate a  new type of  social  experiment 
designed  to  find cost effective ways of  ahortening  unemployment  spells.  These 
experiments  offer large lump sum payments  to people who have filed for 
unemployment  insurance  (UI)  if  they find a job within  a specified  period  oi 
time.  The first  experiments  were conducted  in  Illinois,  and three others are 
underway  or have  been recently completedJ  This paper  analyzes  the results of 
the Illinois experiments  and discusses  their implications  ior theories of 
unemployment  and policy  design. 
In the Illinois  experiments, randomly  assigned UI recipients  were 
eligible  icr a large monetary bonus  if they returned  to work  with  either  theIr 
old employer  or a new employer within  11 weeks.  The results of the 
experiments  were striking;  the mean  spell of UI receipt was significantly 
reduced by the bonus  ro employees.  Even  after  subtracting  the cost  of the 
bonuses,  the stare UI office  appears to have saved money by  shortening 
unemployment  spells.  Surprisingly,  the shorter spells of those eligible  for 
bonus  payments  do not appear  to have come at the expense of  lower  quarterly 
earnings  after  finding a job.  The strength of these results and the 
possibility  that they may affect UI policy2  indicate that the experiments 
merit  a closer  examination.  This paper mostly  discusses  the results of the 
1Furrher experiments  are in progress  or have  been recently completed  in 
New Jersey,  Pennsylvania,  snd Washington.  The experiments  in New Jersey  and 
Pennsylvania  provide job finding services  to some participants  as well as 
bonus  payments.  These  services include job search sssistace, training, 
relocation  assistance  and other services.  Experiments  which will provide 
funds  for self-employment  are also planned. 
2The Department  of  Labor  is currently  funding  these experiments.  As 
stated  in U.S.  Department  of  Labor  (1988) '[t]he goal is to find innovative, 
cost-effective  ways to reduce structural  unemployment,  increase economic 
activity,  and speed up the return of  unemployed workers  to productive  jchs. 2 
Illinois experiments,  although  the experimental  design and some of the tesulrs 
of the other  experiments  are mentioned. 
The reemployment  hazards  for the control and experimental  groupa  are 
analyzed  using parametric  end nonparametric  techniques.  The reemployment 
hazard  rate  for those eligible  for the bonus  is found to be significantly 
higher than the hazard  for the Control Group,  and this pattern  is  evident only 
during  the period of eligibility  for the reemployment bonus.  However,  the job 
finding rate is not found to rise appreciably  just before  the end of the 
period  of  bonus  eligibility.  A rise would  be predicted by most labor supply 
and search  theories of  unemployment. 
The empirical  findings of the paper have additional  implications  for 
theories  of unemployment.  Low income individuals, which  are predicted  by 
labor  supply and search  theories of  unemployment  to respond more to the fixed 
bonus  amount, do not reduce  their unemployment  spells by more than high income 
individuals.  Contrsry to some sesrch  models, reemployment earnings  do not 
fall for the experimental  groups even  though  they find  jobs more quickly. 
Difficulties  with  extrapolating  the experimental  results to a permanent 
reemployment  bonus program  ste emphasized  in the later parts of the paper.  In 
a sample  similar to the Illinois experiment  sample,  it  is found  that about 
half  of those that would  qualify for a bonus returned  to their previous 
employer.  This suggests that a reemployment bonus program would  subsidize 
temporary  layoffs by  firms.  Furthermore,  the timing of the bonus offer  can 
lead  to strong  incentives  for individuals  to prolong unemployment  or to file 
for UI when it would not otherwise  be worthwhile.  Either outcome would 
greatly reduce  the desirability  of a  bonus  program.  Other difficulties  with a 
bonus program  such  as displacement  affects are also discussed. The next two sections set the stage  for the remainder  of the paper. 
Section 2 summarizes  the design  of  the Illinois experiments and their results, 
while  Section  3  describes  theories of  unemployment  that  give predictions  about 
the effects  of a reemployment bonus.  The hazard  rate of exit from the UI 
rolls  is  examined nonparametricaily  and then parametrically  with controls  for 
other variables  in  Section  4.  Section  5  examines the effects of the 
experiments  on  different  income groups.  To check  the validity of the 
experiments,  Section 6 considers  the possibility  that the results are spurious 
Hawthorne  or  placebo  effects.  Some implications of the experiments  for 'abor 
supply and search  theories of  unemployment  are discussed  in Section  7. 
Section 8 discusses  problems with extrapolating  the experimental  results to a 
permanent  reemployment  bonus program.  Section 9 offers some closing comments 
and  conclusions. 
2.  A Summary of  the Illinois Experiments and Their Results 
The Illinois  experiments  were directed by  Robert  Spiegelman  and Steven 
1oodbury  of the Upjohn  Institute and a complete description of the experiments 
and an  excellent  summary of the results can be found in  Spiegelman  and 
Woodbury  (1987) and  Woodbury  and Spiegelman  (1987).  The Illinois experiments 
assigned  those  in  the eligible  population  to one of three groups on  the basis 
of the last two digits of their Social  Security number.  I will  call the three 
groups  the Control Group,  Claimant  Experiment,  and Employer Experiment.  The 
Claimant  Experiment  gave a $500 bonus  to  individuals  who  found a job in less 
than  11 weeks  after  filing for UI and who held that job for at least 4 months. 
The Employer  Experiment  gave a $500 bonus  to employers who hired an individual 4 
less than  Il weeks after  the individual  filed for UI and who employed  tEa 
individual  for at least 4 months  afterwards.3 
The eligible population  that was randomly assignd to  one of the three 
groups  ronsisted  of  those who satisfied  three requirements.  First,  they hed 
to file a monetarily  eligible initial claim  (i.e.  they h.:  to satisfy base 
period  earnings  requirements, and not file a transitional,  additional  or 
reopened claim)  for UI  between July 29,  1984 and November  17,  1984.  Surh 
people  were  eligible  for 26 weeks  of state regular benefits  and up to 12 
additional  weeks of  Federal  Supplemental Compensation benefits.4  Second,  they 
had to register with one of 22 Job Servire offices in Northern  and Centrsl. 
Illinois.  These  22 included  about half of the offices in  the area.  In 
Illinois  and many  other  states  the unemployment  insurance offices and the 
employment  or job service offices are separate entities.  Two important  groups 
are exempted  from  the requirement  of going to the Job Service as part of tha 
search  efforr required  to receive UI.  Individuals who are members  of  unions 
that allocate jobs through a hiring  hall and individuals with  a definite 
recall  date  within  4 weeks  are excluded  from the Job Service requirement. 
Third, they  had to be  between  ages 20 and 54.  The 17,306 people  satisfying 
these  three requirements were randomly assigned to  one of  three  groups. 
A fourth requirement  (and apparently  a reconfirmation  that the first and 
third  requirements  above were  satisfied)  further reduced the sample to  12.101. 
The final requirement  was that claimants  had to be nonmonetarily  eligible 
3In  both experiments,  the individual had to be employed  for at least 30 
hours per week. 
4it was possible  for a  person  to receive UI  benefits  ovet  more than 38 
weeks  in a benefit year if he or she received partial UI during  periods of 
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(i.e.  not have quit  or been fired by their last employer,  and have satisfied 
availabiliry  for work  requirements)  ,  and  the state UI office  had to be  able  to 
locate  their records.  These  screens left approximately  4000 people in  each 
of the three groups:  the Control Croup,  the Claimant  Experiment  and the 
Employer  Experiment.  The randomness  of the assignment  of individuals  to  the 
groups  is supported  by comparisons of  the mean  values of many  attributes  of 
the groups  reported  in tioodbury  and Spiegelman  (1987) 
Individuals  who were assigned to either  the Claimant  Experiment  or the 
Employer  Experiment  were  interviewed by a Job Service employee who explained 
the bonus  for which they were potentially  eligible.  These  individuals  wete 
further asked  to sign  an  agreement  to participate  in the experiment.  84 
percent of those assigned  to  the  Claimant  Experiment  signed  the agreement. 
but only 65 percent of those in the Employer  Experiment  signed. 
The data source  for the empirical work on  the experiments  is  the Public- 
Use Data File documented  in Woodhury et al.  (1987).  This data  set contains 
demographic  variables,  quarterly  earnings, measures  of the amount and timing 
of  UI benefit  receipt, and some demographic  information.  However,  only the 
variables  that were used  in the American  Economic Review  paper by  Woodbury  and 
Spiegelman  (1987) are included.  Information on  recall  to previous jobs,  and 
industry or occupation  are unavailable. 
Most of  the analysis  in the paper will center  on the Claimant  Experiment 
in which  the bonus  was paid  to UI recipients.  There  are several reasons for 
this emphasis.  The experiments  in other states tend  to follow the pattern of 
the Claimant  Experiment,  so it seem likely that any permanent program would 
take this form.  The Claimant  Experiment  is a less complicated  treatment  than 
the Employer  Experiment  since  the employer's  cooperation  ia less important. 6 
Thus,  the Claimant Experiment  results are likely  to he more  pronounced which 
makes  their examination  easier  and less likely  to be inconclusive because of 
sampling error. 
Table  1 displays some of the major findings of  the experiments.  These 
findings were previously  discussed  in Woodhury and Spiegelmen  (1987)  .  The 
results  indicate a strong  effect of  economic  incentives  on job finding 
behavior.  The measures  of  unemployment are always weeks  of  UI benefIts 
received.  The mean  number of  weeks of  compensated  unemployment  are lower  fcc 
both the Claimant Experiment  and the Employer  Experiment  compared with the 
Control Group.  Table  1 reports numbers for both the first spell of 
unemployment  end the benefit year (the 52 weeks  following the clsim date) 
Those assigned  to the Clsimsnt Experiment  bad 1.37 fewer weeks  of  unemployment 
then  the Control Group  in the first spell end 1.15 fewer weeks  in  the benefit 
year.  Both of these numbers are significantly  different  from zero in tests 
with  conventional  sizes.  The differences between  those  in the Employer 
Experiment  end the Control Group  are much smeller;  .67 weeks  in the first 
spell on  average  and .36 weeks  in the benefit year.  Only the first spelt 
difference  is significantly  different  from zero at the  .05  level.  One should 
note that the means being  compared  are everages over the entire populstion 
assigned to each  of the three groups, not only those that agreed  to 
participate.  Therefore,  selection bias is not an issue  in these comperisons. 
Line (3) of  Table  1 indicates  that the reductions  in  weeks of compensated 
unemployment  corresponded  to large reductions  in mean  dollars of UI benefits 
paid.  Even  after  accounting  for the $500 bonuses paid  which  are reported  in 
line (5),  both the Clsimsnt  end Employer Experiments  appear  to have reduced 
government  expenditures. Even more surprisingly,  rhe reduced length of  unemployment  does  not 
appear  to have  been  achieved  st the cost of  lower earnings by UI recipienrs. 
Tables  2 and  3  report a vsriety  of earnings measures.  Lines  (B)  and (9)  of 
Table  2  indicate  that the differences  between the Control Croup and either  of 
the experimental  groups  in terms of mean  quarterly earnings  after  the cod of 
the first unemployment  spell are not significantly different  from zero.  The 
point  estimates of the reemployment  earnings measures  are in fact higher  for 
the Claimant  Experiment  than the Control Croup.  The reemployment  earnings 
measures  are calculated  using  only individuals whose  spells concluded  before 
the relevant quarter. 
Because of the presence of  several very large earnings observations, 
median  and trimmed mean  esrnings  are reported  in Table  3.  The earnings 
meosures  reported in  lines  (1)  through  (7)  of Table 3 sre for rhe subsoripie  of 
positive  observations.  A significant  fraction of individuals have no reported 
post-UI  earnings.  The different  earnings measures  give similar conclusions 
even though the measures are estimated  using different  samples.5 
3.  Theoretical  Effects of the Bonus Offer 
This section describes  labor supply  and search  theories of  unemployment 
and how they  provide  sri analytical  framework in  which  the bonus experiments 
can be examined.  The short  run effects of the experiments  are discussed here: 
it is assumed  thst the experiments did not affect  layoff or  recall  behavior  of 
5  .  If one is concerned  that the bonus offer may have reduced migration  our 
of Illinois,  then using  all observations  (including zeros) would  bias upward 
the Claimant  Experiment post-UI  earnings.  Measures  conditional  on  positive 
earnings  (such as most  of those in  Table 3)  would not be subject  to this 
source of  bias. firms  or the propensity  of individuals  to file for Ut benefits.  This 
assumption  seems reasonable  given that the experiments  only lasted  17 weere 
snd were  not widely publicized,  so that firms likely  did not rake long  terr 
adjustments  to the program.  The long run effects of  adopting  a permanent 
reemployment bonus  program are discussed towards the end of this paper. 
Labor  supply  theories such as Moffitt and Nicholson  (1982) model 
unemployment  in  a static labor-leisure  choice  frarework.  An individual's 
utility  is an  increasing  function of income and unemployment,  where 
unemployment  is valued  because of  its leisure component.  An individual  can 
become  reemployed  at  any time and search behavior  does not affect  the 
reemployment  wage,  The maximization  ia done subject to a budget  constraint 
that is altered by  UI.  The period  over which  this constrained  maximization 
takes place  is moderately  long, such as a year. 
The incentives  of the Illinois bonus  experimenta  can be analyzed  in this 
framework.  Assume  that any leisure during  the period must  be taken in  the 
first spell of  unemployment.  The Claimant  txperiment  then raises by $bOO the 
budget  constraint  of any person who chooses 11 weeks or less of  unemployment. 
Figure  1 displays  the original and modified  budget constraint  created by the 
bonus  program.  The change  in the budget constraint  has different  effects 
depending  on  a person's  location  on the original budget  constraint.  The 
effect  of the bonus  on  the combined population  is uncertain.  If initially a 
person  was unemployed  for 11 weeks  or less,  then the income effect  will cause 
them to lengthen  their unemployment  spell. 
On the other hand,  if a person  was originally unemployed  for more than ii 
weeka,  there  is an  incentive  to reduce  the unemployment  spell to 11 or Lees 
weeks.  Because  of the discontinuity  in the budget  set at 11.  weeka, many 9 
people  will maximize  their utility by receiving exactly 10 weeks of UI.6  One 
muat argue  informally,  aa Moffit  and Nicholoson  do in  their paper,  that the 
random  nature of  job finding leads people  to cluster around  this discontinuity 
point.  This  modification  would  lead to the prediction  of a rising hazard  just 
before then  end of  bonus eligibility.7 
A different  approach  is provided by search theory.  Search  theory 
provides  a reason  other than the consumption  of leisure for why an individual 
might  choose  some unemployment.  This approach models  the unemployed  as 
sampling  job offers until  an acceptable  one has been found.  This process 
makes  the time until  the beginning  of a job a random  variable for a given 
individual, snd simultaneously  explains  the determination  of the person's  wage 
rate. 
Using  a aimplified  version of the models  described  in  Mortensen  (1986) 
Mortensen  (1987) analyzes  the effects of a  reemployment  bonus.  In his model, 
individuals  are wealth maximizing  and have a constant search  intensity.  New 
wage offers  are assumed to arrive  at a rate A0  per week  when  unemployed  and A1 
when  employed.  A wage offer w, is alwaya  a random  draw  from  a stationary 
distribution  of weekly  wages with c.d.f.  F(x).  Individuals  are permanently 
6Levine  (1988)  simulates the effects of the bonus using four different 
aeta of  preferencea  and finds that between one-quarter  and one-half  of the 
sample  is located at the discontinuity  in  the budget  set.  lila  results might 
be softened  if incomplete participation  were aaaumed and if preferences 
conaistent  with the initial diatribution  of  spell  lengths were choaen. 
7An alternative way of  examining  the Illinoia experiments  has been 
suggested  by David  Card and is diacusaed  in Levine  (1988)  .  Aaaume  that  it  is 
costless  to  reallocate  unemployment  during  the  year.  Then the Illinois 
experiment  should only  change  the behavior  of those who wanted  to work  for 
less than  17 weeks  a year,  since 17 weeks  (approximately  4 montha)  is  required 
to receive  the bonua payment.  Thus,  in thia acenario  the budget  constraint  is 
raiaed by $500  if one chooses 35 or leas weeks of  unemployment  rather  than 11 
or less. 10 
laid off from their joba at a rate S  per week.  The unemployed  receive a 
weekly  UI  benefit b, and are eligible for a reemployment  bonus B  if they find 
a job within  the first T weeks  of unemploymenr. 
Given the wealth  maximization  assumption,  the optimal job acceptance 
policy when  unemployed  sets a time dependent reservation  wage which  is  the 
lowest  acceptable  wage offer.  Let  t=0, I  T,  denote  this reservation 
wage when  there are t weeks  remaining  in the reemployment  bonus qualification 
period.  Define W(w)  to be the expected wealth  of an individual  employed at 
wage  w and following  the optimal job offer acceptance  policy.  Similarly 
define V, t=0, 1  T, to be the expected wealth  of an  individual  with 
weeks  remaining in  the reemployment bonus  qualification period.  The 
definition  of the reservation wage then implies that at time t=0, when the 
reemployment  bonus offer  has just  expired, expectad wealth  when  employed  at 
the reservation wage  R0, equals  the value  of  being unemployed,  f.  e. 
(3.1)  V0  W(R0) 
When there are t weeks  remaining  in the bonus  qualification  period,  the 
reservation wage is  the wage R  at  which the value  of employment  plus the 
amount  of the bonus  equals  the value of  being unemployed  with t-l weeks 
remaining  in  the bonus period.  In other words,  solves  the equation 
(3.2)  V1 
= 51(R)  ÷ B, 
where  t=l, 2,.  .  .T. 
The qualitative  implications  of  this model  for the pattern df the hazard 11 
rate of exit from unemployment  can be easily  seen from theae two equations. 
Since V0  W(R0) 
— 
W(R1)  + B,  one sees that  > R. 
Since  the reservation 
wage  is  lower during  the bonus  qualification period  (at least at the very end 
of the period),  the probability  of a job being acceptable  is higher  and the 
hazard  rate of exit from unemployment  is higher.  The hazard  of  exit from 
unemployment  is just the product of the arrival rate of wage offers and  the 
probability  of that offer being  acceptable,  i.  e.  Ao.(lF(R)).  The only 
force  leading the value  of unemployment  to change over  riae is  the length  of 
time remaining  in the eligibility  period.  Since it is unambiguously  herterto 
have  more weeks  remaining  than less, one finds  that Vt > Vtl implying k 
and  the hazard  must be lower earlier in the bonus  period  than later. 
Thus,  the model  implies that the hazard  rises as an unemployment  spell 
progresses  until  one reaches the point where bonus eligibility  ends.  Then, 
the hazard  drop discretely  to a constant lower level.  But, one cannot  tell 
without making  additional  assumptions, whether the new level  of the hazard  is 
higher or lower than the hazard  at the beginning  of a spell. 
The operation  of the Mortensen  (1987) search model  is  clarified by the 
expressions  for maximal  expected wealth  in the different  employment  or 
unemployment  states.  These  expressions  are 
(3.3)  V0 




(3.4)  V  = b  + 
[A0fmax[V  1,W(x)]dF(x) 
+ 
(l-A0)V1], 
t—l, 2,.  .  .T,  and 12 





where  = l/(l+r)  is rhe weekly  discount factor and r is the weekly  interest 
rare.  These equations  indicate that expected wealth  is the sum of income 
received  during  the week and the present value  of the expected end of  veek 
wealth. 
Most of the simulations  performed by  Mortensen  using  this model  show e 
sharp increase  in the reemployment hazard  just  before  the end of the hons 
eligibility  period.  Thus, both the labor supply  end search models  predict 
rise  in the hazard just  before  II weeks. 
4.  Art Analysis  of the Hazard  of Exit  from  Unemployment 
While  Table  1  reported  the effeors of  the experiments  on the mean length 
of  unemployment  spells, this section anslyzes the effects of the experiments 
on the entire  distribution  of spells.  Table 4 displays the distribution  of 
weeks  of compensated  unemployment  in the first unemployment  spell for the 
Control Croup and the two experimentsl  groups.  Table S displays  the analogous 
distributions  of  weeks  of  compensated  unemployment  in the benefit year.8  tot 
each of the three  groups  the size of the risk  set and the number  of spells 
ending in esch  week is reported.  The risk  set is  the set of individuals  who 
could  potentially  have their spells  end in the next time intetvsl.  The number 
8The large number of  spells  of compensated  unemployment  with  26 or 38 
weeks  is explained  by the potentiel  duration of  benefits  in Illinois during  this time  period.  Regular UI benefits  lasted 26  weeks, while  Federal 
Supplemental  Compensation  (FSC)  was svailable during  the early  part of the 
experiment  and lasted  up to 12 weeks.  No new FSC cleims were accepted  sftet 
3/31/85. 13 
of spells  ending divided by the risk  set gives the empirical hazard  which  is 
reported in  Tsbles  6 snd 7.  The empirical hazsrd  in week  C  is  the tate at 
which  spells  end in week t given  thst they have lasted until week t. 
The differences  in  the distribution of  weeks of  compensated  unemplcvment 
between  the Control Croup  and the experimental groups  is most easily  seen in 
terms of rhe empirical hazard.  The Claimant Experiment hazard  is  shove 
the Control Croup  hazard  especially  up until and including  10 weeks.  The 
difference  between  the Employer  Experiment hazard  and the Control Crcup  hz:nrd 
sppears to fall over  time,  but no clear pattern is evident.  Cne can see Cheer 
differences  in Figures 2 and  3.  A pronounced  even-odd effect  where  the hszard 
is higher  in odd weeks  is also apparent.  This pattern  is likely explained  by 
the Illinois requirement  that one send in a certification  form every  two weeks 
to receive benefits,  The certification  form must  list places  where an 
individual has looked  for work,  interviews, etc.  The fitst  form covers  the 
2nd and 3rd weeks  of  benefits,  the next form covets  the 4th and 5th weeks  of 
benefits,  and so on.  It appears that an  appreciable  number of  people  clsim an 
additional  week  of UI thst they are nor entitled  to, or do not bother  to claim 
the last week that they could  receive. 
The differences  between  the experimental group hazards and the Control 
Group hazard  may be more easily seen in Figures 4 and 5.  These  figures show 
the hszsmd  for two intervals.  The experimental  group hazards are clearly 
higher  than the Control Group  for weeks 0 to 10.  There  is some indication  nf 
a higher  relative hazard  in the last few weeks  an individual  would be eligible 
for the bonus payment  in  the Claimant  Experiment.  Ten weeks  of benefits  would 
correspond  to eleven  weeks  after filing  for benefits because  of  the  waiting 
week in  Illinois.  Any tendency  for the experimental  group hazards  to he 14 
higher  or lower  than the tontrol Group hazarda  is difficult  to aee between  Il 
and 24 weeka. 
To teat the viaual  impreaaiona given by  Figurea 2 through  5,  1  perforred 
several ecore teats of the null hypothesis  that the Control Group  and 
experimental hazards  are the same.  These tests oompare one hazard  to another 
and have greatest power  against the alternative  that one hazard  ia 
proportionately  higher  than the other.  Tests for the both the Claimant 
Experiment  v. the Control Group and the Employer Experiaent  v.  the Control 
Group were conducted. 
The teat statistics 
Si  k take the  following form: 
k  2 
S.  =  E  (d  .n  .  -  d  .n jd.  1log(l 
-  d.n.  it 2t  2i ii  1  1.  1.  1J 
k 
2  I  q.n .n .n. 
1  1: 2t a. 
1J 
where  p.  = n.(n. 
-  d.)  d. 
2 
a.  a.  t  a.  log(,l 
-  a.  ) 
d.  n. 
a.  a. 
the  first week  of the period under examination, 
k  the laat week of  the period under examination, 
n1 
= the  aize of  the riak  sat for the control group  in week i, 
n2. 
= the  aize of the tiak  set for the experimental  gtoup  in weak i, 
n. = n  +  n 
1  la.  2a. 
d1. 
= the  numbet of  control  group spells  ending  in week  i. 
d2. 
= the  number of  experimental  group spells ending in week  i,  and 
d. = d  .  + d 
a.  11  2i 
Theae  teat statistics  are discussed  in Kalbileisch  and Prentice  (198C, pp. 
102-3), except  that here they are uaed to teat hypotheaea  about intervals  of 
the hazard  rather than  the entire hazard  at once.  The  teat is  conattucted  so 15 
that if  two hazards have different  shapes, but neither hazard  is on average 
above  the other,  the test  will not reject.  The test is very similar to the 
Savage  log-rank  test, but is more  appropriate  for grouped data. 
The test statistics which  are asymptotically  distributed  chi-square  vith 
one degree of freedom are reported  in  Table 8.  Separate  tests are teported 
for weeks  0-10 and weeks  11-24.  The tests indicate a sharp  divergence  in  the 
patterns  of  the hazards between  the two intervals.  There  is strong  suppott 
for differences  between  the Control Group hazard and  the experimental  group 
hazards over the interval 0-10  weeks.  There  is no support at all for a 
difference  over the 11-24 week interval.  I chose to end the comparisons  at 24 
weeks  to avoid complicating  the comparison with the possible effects of 
nearing  the exhaustion  of UI  benefits. 
A difficulty  with the nonparamerric hazard  plots analyzed  above,  is that 
they implicitly  assume  that the samples are homogeneous,  i.  e.  that all 
individuals  in a given  sample have the same hazard.  Random  assignment  means 
that the distribution  of  heterogeneity  is  the same for the three groups.  But, 
it is possible  that the experimental  treatments  interacted with differences 
across individuals  and caused  the hazard  plots to give an incorrect picture of 
the true effects of the experiments on the time pattern  of the hazards.  For 
example, if  the experimental  treatments  affected those with  higher  underlying 
hazards proportionately  more, an  effect of the experiments  on individuals 
after 11 weeks  might be present, but might not be observable  in the empirical 
hazard  plots  that do not control  for such interactions.  Those with  higher 
hazards would be swept  out of the distribution of  remaining  individuals  rots 
quickly, thus leading one to think  that the experiment  had no effect  after  11 
weeks. 16 
This section describes  hazard models which  control for differencea  across 
individuals.  There are several addirional advantages  to escimaring  parametric 
models.  Hazard  models  can provide estimates  of the effect of an  experiment  on 
the hazard  or an  interval of the hazard.  By controlling  for individual 
attributes  the explained  variance  in the model oay be increased,  thus 
improving  the precision  of esrimared experimental  effects.  Lastly,  the 
interactions between  individual  attributes and experimental  effects may 
themselves be of interest.  Interactions between previous  earnings and 
experimental effects  are examined  in Section 5 using the hazard  model 
estimates. 
Hazard  model  estimates  of several specifications  are reported  in Table 9, 
Time-varying  explanatory  variables  and censoring  are easily  incorporated  in 
the hazard  model approach.  Formally the hazard,  or exit rate from 
unemployment,  1(t)  ,  for  individual  i  at time t is assumed to take the 
proportional hazards  form.  Let T 
be the length  of individual  i's 
unemployment  spell.  Then  the hazard at spell length  r is 
(4.1)  1(t) =  iim  prob(t÷h>T.￿t  I 
h—U  h 
A(t)exp(z.(t)'$), 
where 
1(t) is  the baseline hazard  at time t,  which  is unknown, 
z.(t)  is  a vector  of rime dependent  explanatory  variables  for 
individual  i,  and 
$ is  a vector of  parameters which  is unknown. 
The estimation  approach  taken here  minimizes  functional  form assumptions by 
allowing 1(t) to take any form, and by incorporating  in z.(r) many 17 
interactions between  the covariares  and time.  The approach  follows Prentice 
and Gloeckler  (1978)  ,  and  is extensively  analyzed in Meyer  (1988a)  .  The 
covariate  coefficients  $ and  the baseline  hazard parameters  y(t) are  estimated 
osing  maximum  likelihood  techniques, where 
r  I 
(4.2)  1(t) 
—  lnt 
j A(u)du}. 
t 
Table  9 reports specifications  estimated using the 8.138 people in  the 
Control Croup and the Claimant  Experiment.  The hazard  examined  is the rate at 
which people  end their first spell of UI receipt.  Excluding  the interactions 
with time and experimental  status,  the explanatory variables  are the log of 
average quarterly  earnings  during  the base period,  the  log of the weekly  UI 
benefit amount  including dependents  allowances, age, and dummy variables  for 
race  and sex,  Ideally, one would  like additional  demographic  variables,  hut 
they are not available on the public use tape. 
The key variables  to examine  in Table  9  are Claimant  Experiment  (CE) 
CE.<llweeks,  and CE.week9orlO  (Spike).  The last two variables  are 
interactions between  the Claimant  Experiment dummy variable  and intervals of 
the hazard.  CE<l1weeks corresponds  to the interval during  which  the Claimant 
Experiment  should be operative,  and CE.week9orlO is intended  to capture the 
predicted  rise in the hazard  just before bonus eligibility  ends. 
All five specifications  give similar conclusions.  The coefficient 
estimate  on CE.<llweeks  is always  positive and significant.  It indicates  that 
the hazard  is about  14 percent higher  in the first ten weeks  for the Claimant 
Experiment  than the Control Croup.  The point estimate  of the CE.week9orlO 
coefficient  indicates  that the Claimant  Experiment hazard  rises another  8 
percent relative  to the Control  Group in  the last two weeks  of  bonus 18 
eligibility,  but the coefficient  is nevet close  to being  significantly 
diffetent  from zeto.  The Claimant  Experiment coefficient  is mote complicated 
to interpret.  In specifications  (1)  and (3)  one can see that the Claimant 
Expetiment  and Control Ctoup hazards ate indistinguishable  aftet the bonus 
eligibility  petiod.  To assess the effect  of the Claimant  Experiment variable 
in  the other specifications  one must account for the interaction  terms. 
Interaction  terms also need  to be taken into account  for CE.<llweeka  in 
specification  (5) .  When  interaction  terma  are  included  the  total  eifects  of 
the Claimant  Experiment  and CE.<llweeka  are exttemely  close to the estimates 
in specification  (1)  .  The  demographic  variable coefficients  have the expec:ed 
signs, with  younger workers, men and whites having  higher  hazards.  The 
previous  earnings  and UI benefit coefficients  are very close  (particularly 
specifications  (3) through  (5))  to those found in  Meyer  (1988b) 
In summary,  the Claimant Experiment  is estimated  to raise  the hazard by 
about  14 percent, but only during the first 10 weeks  of  unemployment.  The 
hazard  is estimated  to rise  an  additional  8 percent just  before  the end of 
bonus  eligibility, but one cannot reject  the hypothesis  of a constant hazard. 
There  is little  evidence of  any interaction effects between  the Claimant 
Experiment  and individual  characteristics  as indicated by teats of individual 
interaction  term coefficients,  and likelihood  ratio teata of groups of 
coefficients  that can be  conducted with the log-likelihood  values  reported  at 
the bottom  of  Table  9. 
tried adding  gamma distributed  unobserved  heterogeneity  to 
specification  (5),  but the unreatricted estimate  of the variance waa zero. 19 
5.  Differences  in Experimental  Effects by  Earnings and Benefit Levels 
One might  expect  that formal search  or labor supply models of 
unemployment  would  predict that those with lower earnings,  or lower weekly  l'I 
benefit  payments,  would respond more  to s bonus of a given dollar  amount.  The 
next few paragraphs  describe theories  that imply larger effects of the 
experiment  on low income  groups. 
The effects of s reemployment bonus on different  income groups csn be 
predicted  using  the labor supply  model of Aahenfelter  (1980).  Suppose an 
individual  would  choose  to work h  weeks  if not for the reemployment bonus. 
where h  C h'  ,  and  that the bonus  requires at least h'  weeks  of work.  For 
now, ignore  the effect of  the bonus  on those who work rore rhan h' weeks. 
Accepting  the bonus will  increase an  individual's utility  if the amount  of 
additional  monetary  compensation  (besides the wage)  required for rhis change 
in weeks worked  is  less than the bonus  amount.  The additional  monetary 
compensation  can be  written  as 
(5.1)  C(h'  ,  w,  v)  R(h'  ,  w,  v) 
-  w•h' 
-  E(w,  v), 
where  R(h'  ,  w,  v) 
-  w.h'  is  the constrained  excess  expenditure  function when 
bonus  eligibility  requires h'  weeks of  work.  w is the wage rare, v is the 
utility  level at the unconstrained  optimum, and v is  the level of expenditures 
at that optimum.  All prices  other than  the wage rate have been suppressed. 
Equation  (5.1) can be approximated  using a second-order Taylor  series 
expansion  around  the unconstrained  optimum h.  This expansion  gives  the 20 
10 
approximation 
*2  * 
(5.2)  C(h'  ,  w,  v)  w(h'  -h )  /2eh 
This equation  implies that an individual will accept  the bonua offet  and 
increase his leisure to h'  if 
(5.3)  w(h'  h*)2/2eh  < $500. 
Thia inequality  implies that for a given e and h, those with a low w are acre 
likely  to take the reemployment bonus,  since  the left-hand  side of  (5.3)  is 
more likely  to be less than $500.  This conclusion  requires that differences 
in the labor supply  elasticity e across  income gronps  do not counterbalance 
the differences  in w.  One should  note that h  can be taken to be equal for 
different  income  groups  in the sample since  the differences in mean  weeks .of 
unemployment  are small.11 
A similar prediction  of  larger effects of the experiment  on  lower  inccae 
groups  can be  derived  from Mortensen's  (1987) search model.12  One way to see 
this is to  assume  that there  is a scale parameter p which proportionately 
shifts  the distribution of  wage offers and the weekly  01 benefit  b.  In other 
10See Ashenfelter  (1980,  pp. 552-553) for the derivation.  The 
approximation  proceeds by expanding the right-hand  side of (6) around  h  to 
obtain  C(h'  ,  w,  v)  (BR/Bh-w)(h'  -h )  ÷  l/2(a2R/3h)(h'  -h)2, and then uses 
properties  of the derivatives of the right-hand  side of (6)  with  respect  to 
and h'. 
11  See Table  12 for the income group means. 
12  The approach here follows Mortensen  (1988) 21 
words,  b — 1ib'  for some b' snd the c.d.f. of  wage offers can he written 
F(x,p), where  F(x/p,  1) =  F(x,  p).  Also  assume  for now rhat the bonus  amount 
B=pB'  for some B'.  Under  these assumptions,  the reservation  wages  and the 
expected  income functions  are also shifted proportionately  by p.  This  result 
can be seen by exsmining equation  (3.3)  through  (3.5)  above,  and it implies 
that the hazard  rate  is the same for all income groups.  Now note  that the 
main empirical  deviation  from the shove assumptions  is  that B  is constant  iuc 
all income  groups.  b is proportional  to high  quarter earnings  in Illincis 
(except for the effect of  dependents'  allowances and the benefit cap).  It 
seems  reasonable  to think of  previous  earnings as a proxy for the scale of the 
wage offer  distribution.  But B,  the bonus payment,  is a fixed dollar  amount. 
so that the effect  of the bonus will  be larger for lower income groups.  Thus. 
both  the labor  supply and search models  imply that the effects of the fixed 
dollar  amount  bonus will be greatest  for the low income groups. 
Evidence  on  whether this pattern is found in the experimental  results is 
shown  in  Table  10.  This table reports for a number of  earnings  level groups 
the difference  between  the mean weeks of  unemployment  for the Control Croup 
and those  in the Claimant  Experiment.  There  is no evidence of  a strong 
tendency of those  in lower earnings brackets  to respond more to the fixed 
dollar  amount bonus.  The responses  are remarkably  similar for the different 
groups  except  for the lowest bracket  in Table 10. 
Analogous  tabulations  are shown  for benefit  level groups  in Table  11.  Cf 
there is any effect, lower benefits  should also  increase the effect of the 
bonus  since  lower benefit  individuals would be giving up less in UI paxmen:s 
if they  took  a job more  quickly.  Again,  there is nor a pattern  in the table 
in  this direction.  That no effect  of earnings is found  is even  more 22 
surprising  when one scknowledges  that earnings  and benefits are correlated  arid 
their efferrs should work in the same dirertion. 
Table  12 reports mean characteristics  for different earnings  level 
groups.  The demographic  variables  tend to differ across  the groups  as one 
might predict.  However,  the key variables which  might be correlated  with the 
effects of the bonus  such as aean spell length and frequency of  satisfying  the 
conditions  for the bonus  in the Control Croup, and the fraction agreeing  to 
participate  in  the Claimant txperiaent  do  not differ appreciably  across  the 
earnings groups. 
The  lack of a relationship  between previous eatnings and the effect  cf 
the bonus  is also evident in the hacard model  estimates reported  in Tahie  9. 
These  estimates  control for all other available  individual characteristics. 
The coefficients  on  BPE*CE  and BPE*CEa<llweeks  have the expected signs,  hut 
are never close  to being significantly  different  from zeta.  Thus,  the hacacd 
model  estimates  do not provide any support fat different effects of the 
Claimant  Experiment  an  different  earnings groups.  It may be that this 
hypothesis  is too subtle  to detect  in the data, despite having 
13 
observations. 
6.  The Possibility of  Hswthorne  Effects 
Since the shorter unemployment  spells and apparent cost savings of the 
experiments  are so striking,  one might wonder if  there could be a noneconomic 
13Another possible  explanation  for the lack of an  earnings  effect  is  the 
presence  of  other  social  insurance programs which could  raise marginal  tax 
rates  for low earnings  individuals.  This issue cannot  be tested  ditectiy  in 
the data  set, but it is not  likely to be important  if only 9 percent  of those 
on UI receive other cash  benefits  as suggested by  Storey  (1980) 23 
explanation  for the experimental  effecta.  Responses  that come from  the act cf 
experimentation  itself  rather than the treatment  are sometimea  called 
Hawthorne  effects.14  In  the final report on the experiments  Spiegelman  and 
Woodhury  give two possible ways a Hawthorne  effect might  have appeared.  They 
suggest  that Job Service personnel  could have  more energetically  tried  to 
place experimental  claimants.  I believe they adequately  respond to this 
possibility by pointing  out that the number  of placements  for the Control 
Group and the experimental  groups  is  the same.  Alternatively,  Hawthorne 
effects could have occurred because firms and unemployed  individuals knew that 
shortening  unemployment  spells was the goal of the experiments  and they wanted 
to please  the researchers.  Spiegelman  and Woodbury  respond that there  is 
already a requirement  that those receiving UI search  for a new job. 
The response  to this second  possibility  seems  less convincing,  and an 
additional  possibility  should he added.  Those assigned  to the Claimant  and 
Employer Experiments  had an interview with Job Service  Personnel who explained 
the experiments  and asked  individuals  to sign  an  agreement  to participate. 
Those  assigned  to the Control Group  did not go through an  analogous  procedure. 
Because  of this extra attention,  individuals may have received  the impression 
that they were  being  observed and that their job search  requirement  would he 
more strictly  enforced  or that they better not claim  if they were  really 
14The  term Hawthorne  effects comes  from experiments  conducted at the 
Hawthorne  plant of the Western Electric  Company in Chicago between  1924 and 
1933,  The first  of  the experiments  appeared to show  that  changes  in the  level 
of illumination  resulted  in increases  in  worker  productivity  and job 
satisfaction  whether the lighting was increased  or  decreased.  For a critical 
examination  of  these experiments  see Franke  and Kaul  (1978). 24 
employed  in some manner.15 
Despite my  concern shout  the possibility of  Hawthorne  effects,  I  think 
that several aspects of  the results indicate that Hawthorne  effects  aro rot a 
serious problem.  The pattern of the hazards  seen in Figures 4 and 5 and 
Tables  6  and 7 show that the differences  between the experimental hacards 
(particularly  the Claimant Experiment)  and the Control Group  are concentrated 
in the first ten weeks when the incentive effects of the experiment  ate most 
relevant.  This does not fit with Hawthorne  effects which  should  operate 
throughout  the entire  spell. 
Furthermore,  the effects of the Claimant  Experiment  are much larEer  rhan 
the effects of the Employer  Experiment.  The difference  in mean  weeks  ci 
unemployment  between  the Claimant  Experiment and the Control Group was 1.37 
weeks  in the first spell and 1.15 weeks  in the benefit year compared  to  .68 
and .36 weeks  for the Employer  Experiment compared with  the Control Group. 
The Claimant  Experiment  effects are two and three times as large as those of 
the Employer  Experiment.  Larger responses are expected because  the Employer 
Experiment was a much more complicated  treatment that required the 
participation  of  both the employer  and employee.  Potential  employees had to 
explain  the details of  the experiment  to potential  employers  for the 
experiment  to work.  As  previously  mentioned,  a much  smaller  fraction ci 
individuals  agreed  to participate  in the Employer Experiment  than in the 
Claimant  Experiment.  In  addition,  only 43 percent of those assigned  to tho 
Employer  Experiment  "actively participated"  in the experiment  while  83 percenr 
151f  interviews  with  UI recipients  could  reduce  the length  of 
unemployment,  this would  be an interesting result in its own right.  This 
point was emphasized  to me by Martin  Weitzman  and  has been  made for Hawthorne 
effects  in general by Sommer  (1968). 25 
of  those sssigned  to the Claimant  expetiment  did,  according  to  a follow-up 
survey  described  in the final report.16  Because those  in the Employer 
Experiment  went through the same interview procedure,  it seems  safe to 
conclude  that most of the Claimant Experiment  effects ate true effects  tathec 
than Hawthorne  effects. 
A furthet check that the experimental  effects ate the tesult of the hocus 
rather  than the interviews with  job Service personnel will come from the 
Washington  State Experiment.  This experiment has six experimental  groups with 
three different  levels of the bonus  and two different  lengths of time by  which 
an individual  must be reemploed.''  If one sees much latger effects  for the 
larger bonus  amounts then these differences  are the result of the bonuses 
themselves  and not Hawthotne  effects. 
7.  Implicarions  for Theories of Unemployment 
This  section examines  the implication of the experiments  for labor suppi 
theories and search  theories of  unemployment.  The results of the experiments 
call into question  the applicability  of the standard labor-leisure  model  for 
describing  unemployment.  This model predicts a sharp rise in the hazard 
around  10 weeks and larger effects  for lower income groups.  Because of the 
discontinuity  in the budget  set at 10 weeks of  UI receipt, this model  predicts 
a much  higher  reemployment hazard  at and just before  10 weeks.  Thile  the 
difference  between  the Claimanr Experiment  hszsrd  and that for the Control 
16Donohue  (1988) examines  the differences  between the effects of the 
Claimant Experiment  and Employer Experiment  snd their implications  for the 
Coase  theorem. 
17The Pennsylvania  Experiment  has a similar design. 26 
Group  is slightly  larger around  10 weeks than  in  the immediately preceding 
weeks,  it is even  larger earlier.  To see this pattern examine Figure 0.  The 
spike  predicted  by the theory is  not evident.18 
Labor supply  models  also suggest greater effects for lower income groups 
as shown  in  Section  5.  This  hypothesis  is  not supported by  the data shown io 
Tables 10 and 11, and the hszsrd  model  estimates of  Table  9.  The experirencol 
effects by earnings mod benefit level groups suggest thet m component  of 
unemployment  may be mote "discretionmry"  for higher  income groups, possibly 
because  they have better  opportunities  or they can mote eosily vary scorch 
intensity. 
Even though benefit yest differences  ste smaller then first spell 
differences,  one cannot  conclude  (at least for the Claimant  Experiment)  that 
bonus  payments  cause a reallocation of  weeks of  unemployment  from  before  the 
11 week  cutoff  to later petiods.  Smsller differences  between  the experimentol 
groups  and the Control Group ste found when one exsmines the weeks  of 
unemployment  in the benefit year rather  than just in the first spell.  Toble 
1,  lines  (2s) end (2b) indicate that the difference  fells from 1.37 to 1.15 
weeks  for the Claimant  Experiment  and from  68  to 36 weeks  for the Fmp1oer 
Experiment.19  The problem with this comparison  is that the unemployment 
measures  are weeks  of compensated  unemployment,  end a shorter first  spell will 
18A rise in  the hazard  is also not found just  before  35 weeks  of 
unemployment  as predicted by a model where  an  individual  can costlessly 
reallocate  unemployment  between different  periods.  This could be exploined  by 
there being large fixed costs  to starting or ending unemployment  spells. 
19Even  after adjusting  for the longer remaining  period  left on average in 
the benefit  year for the experimental  groups, one continues  to find s tendency 
for more  weeks  of  unemployment  after the end of the first spell of 
unemployment. 27 
leave more  weeka  of  UI entitlement  for future spells.  If one accounts  for 
this problem by comparing  those with first spells shorter than II weeks,  one 
finds  that the Control Group  and Claimant  Experiment have  the same number of 
weeks of compensated  unemployment after  the first spell.  Cne should note  chat 
there  is an incentive to keep a job  for four months, once one baa been found. 
under  the bonus  experiments.  There  is  some evidence  that thoae in the 
Claimant  Experiment  are mote likely to  keep a job once it has been located, 
but there  is no difference  between the Employer Experiment and the Control 
20 
Group. 
The experiments  also have implications for search theories of 
unemployment.  As discussed  in Section  5,  a simple  search model predicta 
larger  experimental  effects  for those with lower earnings, but this ia not 
found  in  the data.  In standard  search models,  indi','iduala  can find a job more 
quickly by reducing  theft reservation  wage or increasing  their search 
intensity.  The results of  the experiments  suggest that changes  in search 
intensity hy individuals  are more  important than changes in reservation  wages. 
The earnings measures  in Tables  2  and 3 indicated  that the reemployment  wages 
of those assigned  to the Claimant Experiment  did not fall relative  to  those in 
the Control Group even though they spent significantly  less time finding a 
21 
j  oh. 
2074,79 percent  of those in  the Claimant  Experiment who find a job within 
11 weeks do not file for additional  UI benefits within  120 days.  The  figute 
for the control  group is 73.03 percent. 
210ne might  wonder  if the sample  is large enough  to detect  a drop in 
earnings  if it were present.  This is a difficult  question since  it requires a 
number  of assumptions,  but  I  will give a tentative answer.  First, auppoae an 
individual  only reduces his reservation  wage by an  amount  that will  not teduce 
his total earnings  over the expected lifetime of a new job.  Individuals do 
gain the $500 bonua  amount  if they satisfy the bonus  requirements.  The  1.37 
week drop in  weeks unemployed  (from Table 1) then  translates  into a $411 28 
Standard search models  where an investmenr  in search instantaneously 
produces job offers also conflicr wirh  some of rhe experimenral  results. 
Models  like rhe one proposed by  Mortensen  (1987) and described  in Section 3 
suggest  a rapid  rise in the reemploymenr hazard  just before  the 11th week of 
unemployment.  As previously  observed,  rhis pattern  ie nor evident  io the 
hazard. 
The evidence  from the experiments  seems to fit a search model  where 
choice of  search  intensity  is important and where  there is a distributed  lag 
in the time until  the start of a new job after a given  investment  in search. 
It is plausible  that it would  take time  to arrange interviews,  process 
applications,  check references,  and decide on  who to employ,  and then there 
may be a delay until the job begins because of a need  to schedule  training, 
for example.  Suppose there is  a lag between an  in'vstment  in search  and when 
an  individual  begins  a job.  Then if  someone ever searches intensively,  they 
would do so at the beginning  of their unemployment  spell, since  then the 
investment would have a higher  probability  of  producing  a job starting before 
the 11 week bonus  payment cutoff.  Such  a pattern of investment  in seatch 
could produce  the hazard pattern  seen in Figure 4.  The importance  put on 
search  intensity  in this model  also fits with findings that people  reject very 
increase  in earnings  (assuming a $300 weekly wage) which  could be balanced 
against lower  earninga over the life of  the job.  The mean life of a job can 
be approximated  by  using  the percentage  of individuals  who return  to the UI 
rolls over  a four month period  (26.97 %)  calculated  from the Control  Croup. 
Assuming  a constant hazard  of  job breakup,  a mean  job length of 4.94 quarters 
is implied.  This figure  is biased  downward because the hazard  probably 
declines over time, but it  is biased  upward because most people change  jobs 
without  receiving  UI.  Dividing the $411 by  4.94 yields $83.2  which  is  1.53 
standard deviations  of the difference  between 1st quartet after end of first 
spell earnings  for the Control Croup  and the Claimant Experiment.  Thus,  this 
suggests  that about  94% of the time one should  see a  fall in post-unemployment 
earnings  if it is present. 29 
few wage  offers.22 
8.  Implications of  the Experiments  for Policy Design 
This  section describes  in turn rhe possibilities  of firm or worket 
sttategic behavior  in response to a permanent bonus  program,  and the 
possibility  of displacement  effects.  A key consideration  in evaluating  the 
results of the experiments  and their  implications for policy  is the potential 
use of UI by firms  to subsidize temporary  layoffs of their employees.  Firms 
seem attuned  to  the incentives  created by UI systems as shown by work  on the 
effects of incomplete UI experience  rating by  Brechling  (1981), Topel  (1983) 
and others.  The experimental  design  attempted to exclude those likely  tc be 
recalled by their previous  employer.  However evidence from  a sample of  Ut 
recipients  in Missouri23  indicates that recalls are still  likely to have been 
important  in the Illinois  sample.  To be eligible  inc assignment  to one of the 
three groups  in the Illinois experiment,  an individual had to register with 
the state employment  service2 (which  is generally  separate from  the UI 
office).  To receive a bonus  an  individual had to  find a jab within  11 weeks. 
In the Missouri  data set almost half (48 percent) of those registering wirh 
the employment  service and finding a job within  11 weeks were recalled.  Some 
characteristics  of this Missouti data  set are reported  in Table 11.  People 
22See U.S. Department  of Labor  (1975)  for example.  Blau (1987) provides 
some evidence  which  seems to conflict with the conventional  wisdom. 
23The recoded version  of this data  set is described  in Katz and Meyer  (1983 
241n both Illinois and  Missouri  all Ut claimants  are required  to register 
with the employment  service unless  they have a definite  recall date or are 
members of  unions  hiring  through hiring  halls. 30 
who register with  the Employment  Service ate less likely to he recalled rhoo 
others, hut those with the short spells needed  to qualify  for the bonus 
payments  are more likely  to have  been  recalled. 
It is likely  that a similar  fraction of those receiving bonuses  in 
Illinois were recalled,25  It  is also unlikely  that firms'  layoff and reoall 
policies  were changed by  the Illinois expariments  beoausa they lasted  aol'.'  i 
weeks  and were  not publicized.  However,  in the long run firma would  adjust 
their policies,  and a  bonus  system  like that in the Illinois experiments  'aouid 
be an anormous subsidy to temporary layoffs.  An employer or employee  could 
receive  almost $1500 each  year from  rho state  if rho system were adopted oo  a 
2g 
long term basis and recalls were eligible for the bonus, 
On  alternative  is no exclude recalls  (as  is being done  in New Jersey  and 
Washington  Stare)  but this provides  some incentive ro break  up valuable  job 
matches,  The elasticity  of  match  breakups may be small if they are in fact 
valuable.  If recalls are ineligible,  oot only would  it eliminate  the subsidy 
to temporary  layoffs, but it might even further reduce  the layoff  frequency  if 
firma want to avoid having  their employees  join another firm.  In any case,  if 
recalls  are excluded  one might  still see employees  rotating between similar 
firms. 
Another  issue is raised by the high frequency  of recalls in the analogous 
Missouri  sample.  If the Olaimant  Experiment only affected half of those 
assigned  to the experiment  because  the rest were awaiting recall,  then the 
25The New Jersey  experiment  sample had similar exclusions  to  Illinois and 
yet 33 percent of the sample  expected to be recalled.  Actual  recall  among 
those  finding a job within  eleven weeks was likely higher  since  spells coding 
in  recall  are typically short. 
26The  four month work requiriment  after starting a job would  limir one tO 
just under  three bonuses  per year. 31 
elasticities  of  job finding behavior with respect to the bonus rust have been 
almost  twice as large for the remaining  population.27  Finally, one shnuld 
note that if  recalls are excluded, a UI bonus experiment  would only be 
applicable  to a small  fractinn of the unemployed.  Only about one-third  of the 
unemployed  receive UI, and only about one-third  of  this group is not 
28  recalled. 
The possibility  of srrategio worker  behavior would  atise with the long- 
run adoption  of  a reemployment bonus program.  It is  diffioult,  if not 
impossible  to choose  a point  in the unemplo;rsent  spell when  individuals  becoce 
eligible  for a bonus  that doer  ' .t have important  aide effects.  This problem 
does not appear in the experii:  :.nts  because  they are only temporary and the 
problem affects  experimentals  and controls  equally because  of the 
randomization.  Two examples  froe differont  atatea  uill  illustrate  the 
problem. 
The  New Jersey  experiment  offered  individuals  large bonuses (initially 
$1,600 on  average)  beginning about  the seventh veek after filing  for UI.  This 
bonus  amount was about  five weeks wages  on average.  If the program were 
instituted  on  a permanent basis  in this form, it would  cause people  with 
previously  short spells  to lengthen them  to be eligible  for this large bonus 
payment.  Anyone  who was planning  to start a job after  two weeks  of UI,  could 
increase his  or her income  (and leisure) by  waiting another few weeks  to be 
27A sizable  fraction of those in  the Olaimant  Experiment  did not actively 
participate  in the experiment  (maybe because  it was a temporary program) 
.  One 
could make a similar argument about  inflating elaaticires  to account for 
incomplete  participatiod  in the experimenra. 
28See  Burtless  (1983) and Blank  and Oard  (1981) for the evidence on the 
insured unemployment  rate, and Katz and Meyer  (1981) icr the evidence on the 
prevalence  of  recall  among UI recipients. 32 
eligible  for the bonus. 
The experiments in  Illinois and Washington have  taken the opposite 
approsch  of msking  a person  immediately  eligible for the bonua aftet  filing 
for UI.  This choioe is likely  to cause many people  to  file for UI  who 
otherwise  would not bother.  For example, people  who already have  a new job 
lined up may now decide  it is worth  filing for benefits.  deny  people  vait a 
few weeks  before  filing, and many  currently never do, so that many people 
nould  potentially  adjust  their behavior.  The mean rime between  rhe boginning 
of unemployment  and filing  for UI  is 4.3 weeks  in a sample of  380,000 
unemployment  spells from  eight atstea  that I am  currently  examining.  Blank 
and Card (1988) eatimate that 72 percent of those eligible for UI in the 
Current  Population  Survey  (CPS) during 1980-82 and 83 percent of  household 
heads  eligible  for UI in  the Panel Study of Income  Dynamics (P510) during 
1980-82 did not receive benefita.29  Even this undoubtedly  miaaea  many people 
vith short spells  or people  who change jobs without  unemployment who could 
become  claimenta  if there were strong  financial  incentives to do so,  The 
larger  number of  benefit payments caused  by added claimants could  very well 
eliminate  any coat savings of  a bonus  program. 
A final issue about the interpretation  of the experiments  is the 
possibility  of displacement effects.  Even though those  in the Claimant 
Experiment  found jobs more quickly, they may have done so at the expense  of 
other  people who took  longer  to find jobs.  These displacement  effects are an 
important  issue when  determining  the welfare effects of many labor market 
policies.  The experiments  in  Pennsylvanis and Wsshington  will try to examine 
29  .  .  See  Blank  and Card (1988) for a d:acuaaion  of the drfferences  between 
the CPS and PSID numbers.  The population  of  unemployment  spells  in the two 
surveys differ  along aeversl dimensions. 33 
this issue by  comparing  tha control  group to individuals  in geographically 
separated  labor markets.  While  I am  skeptical of the ability of these 
experiments  to measure such affects  given the small fraction  of job chentes 
affected by the axperiments.  I  plan to examine the data as they become 
available. 
9.  Some Additional  Comments and Conclusions 
The  Illinois experiments  show  that economic  incentives have strong 
effects on  the job  finding hehoior of  UI recipience.  On the other hand,  che 
experiments  do not provide ccu"incing  evidence on the suitability of a 
reemployment  bonus ptogcem for pecmanent  adoption.  The desirability of 
permanent bonus  progrem would dcpend on  fito and cocker  strategic  responsos  :0 
such  a program.  These  respuuccs right work to  inccease unemployment  and 
increase UI payments.  Oisplscemenc  effects could  .ilso  reduce  the desirabilic': 
of a bonus  program.  In  a permanent  program,  a larger fraction of those who 
qualify for a bonus might  complete  the paperwork necessary  to receive  it.  The 
numbers  in Table  1 indicate that this would drsmsricall'c  reduce  the cost 
savings of  a bonus program. 
Furthermore,  any full welfare  analysis of s bonus  system should  examine 
the effect of the bonus  on  earnings  of  UI recipients.  The savings  in payments 
by the state UI office  are just reductions  in UI payments received by 
individuals.  However,  the ñecressed earnings  of 01  recipients might  well 
greatly outweigh  the lost benefit payments.  The numbets in Tables  2  and  3  ace 
encouraging  in  this regard; those  in the Olsimsnt Oxperiment  earn  several 
hundred dollars more in the year following  the initial claim  for UI  This 34 
amount  is much larger  than the reduction in  UI benefits  received. 
Finally, many  of the issues discussed here implicitly  deal with the issns 
of the design  nf an  optimal UI system as previously  discussed by Shevell end 
Weiss  (1979) and Haueman  (1984)  .  A  permenent  bonue system  is just another 
pattern of  payment of UI  benefits  over time.  Niany of the issues discussed 
here could be applied to this literature and would suggest that the dssipn  of 
an  optimal UI system must  account  for incentives  foc teapocacy layoffs  as nell 
as  the possibility  of encouraging cc  discouraging  edded UI claimants.  For 
example,  if  one were to move towards a payment scheme which provided  a isrce 
lump sum payment at the beginning  of an  unemployment  spell,  this aight  veil 
dramatically  increase the fraction of individuals  who bother  to file for UI 
end would thus increase UI payments. 35 
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Table  1 
Key Results  from  the Illinois  Unemployment 
Insurance  Incentive  Experiments 
Control  Claimant  Empln:et 
Group  Experiment  Expericsn: 
(1)  Mean  Weeks  of insured 
unemployment 
(a)  First  spell  18.3  17.0  13.7 
(.203)  (.199) 
(b)  Benefit  year  20.1  18.9 
(.191)  (.189) 
(2)  Differente  in weeks betwon 
experimental  group  and 
control  group 
(Experimental-Control) 
(a)  First  spelt  -1.37  -0.68 
(.280)  (.289) 
(b)  Benefit  year  -1.15  -0.30 
(:269)  (.273) 
(3)  Difference  in total benefits  ($) 
paid between  experimental 
group  and control  group 
(Experimental -  Control) 
(a)  First spell 
---  -229  -il2 
(47.1)  (48.2) 
(b)  Benefit year  ---  -194  -61 
(46.1)  (07.1) 
(4)  Percentage  qualifying  for bonus  20.7  25.0  22.8 
(0.64)  (0.67)  (0.67) 
(5)  Percentage  receiving  $500 bonus  13.6  2.8 
(0.53)  (0.26) 
(6)  Sample size  3,952  4.l86  3,963 
Notes:  (1)  Standard  errors  ste  in parentheses.  (2)  The  data for these 
calculations  came from the Public-Use  Data  File documented  in Woodbuty  et sl. 
(1987) (4)  First  full quarter  after 
initial  claim 
1370.70  1272.23 
(38.41)  (32. 57) 
9=4118  9=2875 
38 
Table  2 
Mean Earnings  Measures  for Control  Croup, 






Earnings  in Dollats 
Claimant  Ecp1oo 
Croup  Experiment  Experiment 
Average  Quarterly Earnings 
in  Base Period 
(2)  Quarter  before  initial  claim 
(3)  Quarter  of initial  claim 
3188.31  3221.98  3214.7 
(35.89)  (36.91)  (37.S3 
9=3952  9=4186  9=3962 
3640.39  3631.07  3622.55 
(43.43)  (43.25)  (42.52) 
9=3866  9=4118  9=3875 
2445.71  2474.26  2s21.32 
(45.9u)  (50.12)  [*54 




1676.04  1870.42  1674.20 
(36.92)  (88.66)  (37,52: 
9=3866  9=4118  9=3875 
2069.94  2072.93  193,56 
(42.17)  (39.60)  (39.41) 
9=3866  9=4118  9=2876 
7422.41  7788.31  7244.48 
(117.88)  (149.21)  (114.04) 
N=3866  9=4118  9=3878 
2057.52  2145.53  2038.22 
(39.12)  (38.63)  (29.16( 
9=3865  9=4111  9=2875 
2703.37  2750.25  2524.08 
(57.40)  (128.81)  (50.79) 
9=2443  9=2784  9=2572 
(5)  Second  full quarter  after 
initial claim 
(6)  Third  full quarter  after 
initial  claim 
(7)  Year beginning  with quarter 
of initial claim (sua of 
(3) through  (6)) 
(8)  First full quarter  after 
end of first  spell 
(9)  Second  full quarter  after 
end of first spell 
Notes:  (1) Standard  Errors  are in  parentheses.  (2) The data for these 
calculations  came from the Puhlic-Use  Data File  documented  in Woodhuty  et a). 
(1987). 39 
Table 3 
Median  and Trimmed  Mean  Earnings  Measures  for Control  Group, 
Claimant  Experiment,  and Employer  Experiment 
Time  Period 







(1)  Average  Quarterly  Earnings  2784  2696  2666 
in Base Period  (median)  (48.97)  (46.23)  (1339: 
2=2738  2=2966  2=2753 
(2)  First  full quarter  after  826  1990  963 
initial  tlaim  (median)  (52.24)  (42.49)  (50.97) 
2=2652  2=2898  2=2668 
(3)  Setond  full quarter  after  l962  2989  1934 
initial  claim  (median)  (54.16)  (45.87)  (70.86: 
2=2652  2=2898  2=2668 
(4)  Third full quarter  after  2552  2559  2544 
initial  claim  (median)  (62.92)  (43.22)  (62.16) 
2=2652  2=2898  2=2665 
(5)  Year  beginning  with quorter  7859  8056  7936 
of initial  claim (median)  (154.61)  (114.81)  (121.61! 
2=2652  2=2898  2=2668 
(6)  Fimst  full quarter  after  27CC  2794  2682 
end of first  spell  (median)  (74.36)  (35.36)  (54.53) 
2=2541  2=2776  2=2547 
(7)  Second  full quarter  after  3254  3172  3158 
end of first  spell  (median)  (79.19)  (39.32)  (51.23) 
2=1795  2=2979  2=1862 
(8)  First  full quarter  after  2955.15  2112.58  2437,6)' 
end of first  spell  (38.82)  (38.25)  (39.48) 
(trimmed  mean)  2=3865  2=4111  2=3875 
(9)  Second  full quarter  after  2662.25  2634.73  2524.98 
end of first  spell  (53 55)  (49.88)  (54.79'! 
(ttimmed  mean)  2=2439  2=2754  2=2572 
Notes:  (1)  Standard  Errors  are in parentheses.  (2) The data  for these 
calculations  came  fmom  the Public-Use  Data Pile  docuinen ted in :Jcodhury  e t al 
(1987)  .  (3)  Lines I  to  5  are calculated using only  the ohaervations  with 
positive  earnings in  the second and  third full  quartets  after  the  initial 
claim.  Lines  6  and  7  are calculated using only  the  positive  obsetvotions for 
each series.  In all cases the standard error  of  the  median  is calculated 
using  a  Normal kernel with  standard  deviation 15.  (4)  The  trimmed  means 
include only  the first $20,090 of quarterly  earnings  for  an  individual. 40 
Table 4 
Distribution  of Weeks of Compensated  Unemployment  in  First  Spell  for 
the Control  Group, Claimant  Experiment,  and Employer  Experiment 
Control  Claimant  EmploYer 
Week  Group  Experiment  Experiment 
Risk  Completed 
Set  Spells 
Risk  Completed 
Set  Spells 
Risk  Comple:ed 
Set  Speils 
0  3952  310  4186  369  3963  344 
1  3642  190  3817  257  3619  193 
2  3452  95  3560  137  3421  118 
3  3357  184  3423  199  3303  178 
4  3173  80  3224  100  3125  113 
5  3093  135  3124  141  3012  149 
6  2958  73  2983  93  2863  81 
7  2885  112  2890  141  2782  116 
8  2773  58  2749  72  2666  64 
9  2715  103  2677  120  2602  100 
10  2612  55  2557  80  2502  61 
Il  2557  77  2477  80  2441  76 
12  2480  48  2397  51  2365  42 
13  2432  84  2346  85  2323  93 
14  2348  43  2261  46  2225 
15  2305  60  2215  70  2180  76 
16  2245  39  2145  37  2104  41 
17  2206  62  2108  70  2063  56 
18  2144  36  2038  40  2007  35 
19  2108  66  1998  61  1972  61 
20  2042  43  1937  36  1911  38 
21  1999  84  1901  57  1873  53 
22  1915  32  1844  32  1820  33 
23  1883  70  1812  72  1787  63 
24  1813  46  1740  40  1724  41 
25  1767  98  1700  93  1683  29 
26  1669  879  1607  847  1604  305 
27  790  61  760  62  799  60 
28  729  25  698  20  739  22 
29  704  13  678  19  717  24 
30  691  21  659  23  693  13 
31  670  17  636  21  680  19 
32  653  11  615  11  661  15 
33  642  13  604  13  646  13 
34  629  17  591  26  633  19 
35  612  22  565  16  614  19 
36  590  30  549  13  595  15 
(con  inued 41 
Table  4--Continued 
C  ontrol  Claimant  Ersplover 





Risk  Completed 
Set  Spells 
Risk  Completed 
Sos  Spells 
37  560  20  536  20  580  21 
38  54C  512  515  081  559  520 
39  28  19  35  23  39  15 
40  9  5  12  4  13  5 
41  4  2  8  4  7  4 
42  2  1  4  2  3  1 
43  1  0  2  0  2  1 
44  1  0  2  1  1  0 
45  1  0  1  0  1  0 
46  1  0  1  0  1  1 
47  1  0  1  0  0  0 
48  1  1  1  1  0  0 
Notea:  (1)  The data for rheso calculations  came from the Public-Use  Dots 
File documented  in Woodbumy  cc al.  (1987). 42 
Table  5 
Distribution  of  Seeks  of Compensated  Unemployment  in Benefit Year for 
the Control  Group,  Claimant  Experiment,  and Employer  Experiment 
Control  Claimant  Employer 
eek  Group  Experiment  Experiment 
Risk  Completed 
Set  Spells 
Risk  Completed 
Set  Spells 
Risk  Completed 
Set  Spells 
0  3952  207  4186  256  3963  24 
1  3745  128  3932  178  3716  135 
2  3617  68  3754  96  3581  32 
3  3549  154  3658  157  3499  143 
4  3395  65  3501  79  3356 
5  3330  101  3422  122  3279 
6  3229  66  3300  93  3165  6 
7  3163  101  3207  114  3098  95 
8  3062  59  3093  79  3003  54 
9  3003  93  3014  111  2949  97 
10  2910  54  2903  73  2852  59 
11  2856  70  2830  86  2793  74 
12  2786  54  2744  54  2719 
13  2732  85  2690  90  2676  33 
14  2647  45  2600  39  2593  54 
15  2602  70  2561  75  2537  80 
16  2532  57  2486  39  2457  iS 
17  2475  83  2447  81  2409  63 
18  2392  43  2366  48  2346  40 
19  2349  62  2318  69  2306  71 
20  2287  38  2249  41  2235  43 
21  2249  78  2208  62  2192  69 
22  2171  40  2146  36  2123  41 
23  2131  84  2110  85  2082  38 
24  2047  48  2025  58  1994  57 
25  1999  109  1967  101  1937  97 
26  1890  1047  1866  1029  1840  972 
27  843  82  837  107  868  88 
28  761  31  730  24  780  33 
29  730  17  706  22  747  26 
30  713  22  684  27  721  16 
31  691  18  657  24  705  22 
32  673  14  633  13  683  16 
33  659  14  620  14  667  14 
34  645  17  606  27  653  20 
35  628  23  579  17  633  20 
36  605  31  562  13  813  15 
(coot  I  ue  4) 43 
Table  5--Continued 
Control  Claimant  Employer 
Week  Group  Experiment  Experiment 
Risk  Completed 
Set  Spells 
Risk  Completed 
Set  Spells 
Risk  Completed 
Set  Spells 
37  574  21  549  20  598  22 
38  553  522  529  491  576  523 
39  31  21  38  25  43  29 
40  10  6  13  4  14  6 
41  4  2  9  5  3  4 
42  2  1  4  2  4  1 
43  1  0  2  0  3  2 
44  1  0  2  1  1  0 
45  1  0  1  0  1  0 
46  1  0  1  0  1  1 
47  1  0  1  0  0  0 
48  1  1  1  1  0  0 
Notes:  (1)  The data for these  calculations  oame  from the public-Use  Data 
File documented  in  Tvoodbucy  et al.  (1987). Table 6 
the First  Spell of Compensated  Unemployment 
Claimant  Experiment,  and Employer  Experiment 
Empirical  Hazard 
44 
Empirical  Hazard  for 
for the Control  Group, 
1eek  Claimant 
Experiment 
Control  Employer 
Group  Experimenc 
0  0.0784  0.0882  0.0868 
1  0.0522  0.0673  00547 
2  0.0275  0.0385  0.0345 
3  0.0548  0.0581.  0.0539 
4  0.0252  0.0310  0.0362 
5  0.0436  0.0451  0.0492 
6  0.0247  0.0312  0.0283 
7  0.0388  0.0488  0.0417 
8  0.0209  0.0262  0.0240 
9  0.0379  0.0448  0.0384 
10  0.0211  0.0313  0.0244 
11  0.0301  0.0323  0.0311 
12  0.0194  0.0213  0.0178 
13  0.0345  0.0362  0.0422 
14  0.0183  0.0203  0.0202 
15  0.0260  0.0316  0.0349 
16  0.0174  0.0172  0.0195 
17  0.0281  0.0332  0.0271 
18  0.0168  0.0196  0.0174 
19  0.0313  0.0305  0.0309 
20  0.0211  0.0186  0.0199 
21  0.0420  0.0300  0.0283 
22  0.0167  0.0174  0,01.81 
23  0.0372  0.0397  0.0353 
24  0.0254  0.0230  0.0238 
25  0.0555  0.0547  0.0469 
26  0.5267  0.5271  0.5019 
27  0.0772  0.0816  0.0751 
28  0.0343  0.0287  0.0298 
29  0.0185  0.0280  0.0335 
30  0.0304  0.0349  0.0188 
31  0.0254  0.0330  0.0279 
32  0.0168  0.0179  0.0227 
33  0.0202  0.0215  0.0201 
34  0.0270  0.0440  0,0300 
35  0.0359  0.0283  0.0309 
36  0.0508  0.0237  0.0252 
(continued) 45 
Table  6-  -Continued 
week 
Empirical  Hazard 
Control  Claimant  Employer 
Group  Experiment  Experiment 
37  0.0357  0.0373  0.0362 
38  0.9481  0.9322  0.9302 
39  0.6786  0.6571.  0.6667 
40  0.5556  0.3333  0.4615 
41  0.5000  0.5000  0.5714 
42  0.5000  0.5000  0.3333 
43  0.0000  0.0000  0.5000 
44  0.0000  0.5000  0.0000 
45  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
46  0.0000  0.0000  1.0000 
47  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
48  1.0000  1.0000  0.0000 
from the Public-Use  Data  Notes:  (I)  The data for these  Calculations  came 
File documented  in Woodbury  et al.  (1987). 46 
Table  7 
Empirical  Hazard  for Weeks  of Compensated  Unemployment  in the Benefit  Year 
for the Control  Group,  Claimant  Experiment,  and Employer  Experiment 
Empirical  Hazard 






0  0.0524  0.0607  00623 
1  0.0342  0.0453  0.0363 
2  0.0188  0.0256  0.0229 
3  0.0434  0.0429  0.0409 
4  0.0191  0.0226  0.0229 
5  0.0303  0.0357  0.0348 
6  0.0204  0.0282  0.0212 
7  0.0319  0.0355  0.0307 
8  0.0193  0.0255  0.0180 
9  0.0310  0.0368  0.0329 
10  0.0186  0.0251  0.0207 
11  0.0245  0.0304  0.0265 
12 
•  0.0194  0.0197  0.0158 
13  0.0311  0.0335  0.0310 
14  0.0170  0.0150  0.0216 
15  0.0269  0.0293  0.0315 
16  0.0225  0.0157  0.0195 
17  0.0335  0.0331  0.0262 
18  0.0180  0.0203  0.0171 
19  0.0264  0.0298  0.0308 
20  0.0166  0.0182  0.0192 
21  0.0347  0.0281  0.0315 
22  0.0184  0.0168  0.0193 
23  0.0394  0.0403  0.0423 
24  0.0234  0.0286  0.0286 
25  0.0545  0.0513  0.0501 
26  0.5540  0.5514  0.5283 
27  0.0973  0.1278  0.1014 
28  0.0407  0.0329  0.0423 
29  0.0233  0.0312  0.0348 
30  0.0309  0.0395  0.0222 
31  0.0260  0.0365  0.0312 
32  0.0208  0.0205  0.0234 
33  0.0212  0.0226  0.0210 
34  0.0264  0.0446  0.0306 
35  0.0366  0.0294  0.0316 
36  0.0512  0.0231  0.0245 
(continued) 47 
Table  7--Continued 
Empirical  Hazard 
Week  Control  Claimant  Employer 
Group  Experiment  Experiment 
37  0.0366  0.0364  0.0368 
38  0.9439  0.9282  0.9253 
39  0.6774  0,6572  0.6744 
40  0.6000  0.3077  0.4286 
41  0.5000  0.5556  0.5000 
42  0.5000  0.5000  0.2500 
43  0.0000  0.0000  0.6667 
44  0.0000  0.5000  0.0000 
45  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
46  0.0000  0.0000  6.0000 
47  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
48  1.0000  1.0000  0.0000 
Notes:  (1)  The  data  for these  calculations  came 
File documented  in k'oodburv ct al.  (1987). 
from the Public-Use  Dato 48 
Table  8 
Score  Tests  for a Proportional  Shift  in the Hazard  Between 
the Conrrol  and Experimental  Groups 
0-10  Peeks  11-21 Peeks 
(1)  Control  Group v. Claimant  Experiment 
(a)  First  spell  25.36  .26 
(N)  Benefit year  20.33  19 
(2)  Control  Group  v.  Employer  Experiment 
(a)  First  spell  8.33  .00 
(N)  Benefit year  3.48  .22 
Notes:  (1) See the text for the ronstrurtion  of the teat statistics. 
(2)  Under  the null hypothesis  of equal  hazards  the cesr statistics  are 
asymptotirally  chi-square  with one degree of freednm.  The  critical  values 
for the test  are  3.84 and 6.64 at the  .05 and .01 level  respectively. 49 
Table 9 
Estimates  of the First Spell Hazard  Rate 
a  for the Combined  Control  Group  and Claimant  Experiment  Sample 




- .0126  - .0117  - .0125  - .0117  - .0146 
(0.0017)  (0.0025)  (0.0030)  (0.0035)  (0.0042) 
.2700  .2972  .4751  .4937  .4737 
(0.0400)  (0.0593)  (0.0693)  (0.0811)  (0.1022) 
- .5205  - .5195  - .5919  - .5889  - .5366 
(0.0367)  (0.0534)  (0.0640)  (0.0735)  (0.0865) 
.0899  . 1006  .  1706  . 1779  .  12!3 
(0.0301.)  (0.0441)  (0.0526)  (0.0606)  (0.0739) 
- .4655  - .5715  - .51)5  - .7063 
- .6545 
(0.0660)  (0.0976)  (0.1.1)8)  (0.1357)  (0.1705) 
.0146  - .4871  .0)40 
- .5565  - .5883 
(0.0508)  (0.3381)  (0.0507)  (0.3414)  (0.5961) 
.1432  .1437  . 1552  .1490  .1629 
(0.0635)  (0.0636)  (0.0637)  (0.0639)  (0.0647) 
.0849  .0844  .0851  .0848  .0839 
(0.1133)  (0.1134)  (0.1133)  (0.1134)  (0.1134) 
BPE•CE  ---  - .0505  ---  -  .0367  .0032 
(0.0802)  (0.0796)  (0.1388) 
Blaok.CE  ---  - .0028  ---  -  .0073 
- .1176 
(0.0737)  (0.0743)  (0.1284) 
Msle.CE  ---  -.0202  ---  -  .0141  .0921 
(0.0603)  (0.0605)  (0.1053) 
BEN'CE  ---  .2006  ---  .1917  .0855 
(0,1324)  (0.1323)  (0.2359) 
(continued) 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Age 
Log Base Period 
Earnings  (BPE) 
Blaok=l 
Msle=1 
Log  UI  Benefit (BEN) 
Claimant  Experiment  (CE) 
CE.  <llwee  ks 
CE.week9orlo  (Spike) 
Age•CE  - .0018 
(0.0035) 
-.0019  .0040 
(0.0035)  (0.0061) - .0003 
(0.0037) 
- - -  -  - -  - .3047 
(0.0843) 
--  -  .1114 
(0.0790) 
--  -  - .1212 
(0.0646) 
-  - -  - - -  .2195 
(0.1449) 
.0002 






(0.  0647) 
.2099 
(0.1450) 
aSdd  errors  are shown  in 
deviations  of the key variables  in 
First  Spell  Age 
Mean  16.33  32.95 
bThe critical  values  of a test with 4 chi-square  distribution  with five 
degrees  of freedoa  are 11.07  and 15.09 at the  .05  and  .01  levels 
respectively. 
50 
Table  9--Continued 
Specification 
Variable 

























(0. 1692 i 
.1680 
(0.15841 




587. 16  566.25  568. 12  582. 88  584.95 
Standard  Dev.  9.98 
parentheses.  The aeans  and standard 
the specifications  are: 
BPE  Black  Mate  BEN  CE 
7.83  .26  .56  4.63  .51 
6.66  .73  .44  .50  .43  .50 51 
Table 10 
The Responsiveness of  Different Income Groups 
to the Claimant Experiment 
Average Quarterly 
Base Period Earnings 
(dollars) 
Difference in  Mean 
Weeks in First Spell 
(experimenrals 
Difference in 
Weeks in Benefi 
minus controls) 
Mean 
t  Year 
<1200  - .370 
(.564) 
-  074 
(.626) 
N  = 613 
Nc 




N  722 
N° = 




N  778 
N°  866 




N  = 639 
NL 
4001-5000  -2.192 
(.870) 
-1.299 
C  838) 
N  = 4T 
N° = 414 




N  660 
N° = 724 
Notes:  (1)  Standard Errors are  in parentheses.  (2)  TUe data for these 
calculations came from the Public-Use Data File docuicenred  in Woodhury or al. 
(1987).  (3)  N  is the sample sire for the Control Croup and N  is the sample 
size for the  Claimant Experiment. 52 
Table 11 
The Responsiveness of Different Benefit Level 
Groups to the Claimant Experiment 
Weekly Benefit  Difference in Mean  Difference in Mean 
.  Amount  Weeks  in  First  Spell  Weeks  in  Benefit  Year 




<86  - .898  - .691 





86-12D  -2.D14  -2.090 





121-lED  - .102  - .367 





161-208  -1.583 
- .820 





209  -2.260  -2.002 





Notes: (1)  Standard Errors are in parentheses.  (2) The data 
calculations came from rhe Public-Use Data File docurented in 
(1987)  .  (3)  N  is the sample sire for the  Control Group and 










































































































Mores: (1)  (2)  The data for these  Standard Errors are in parentheses. 
calculations came from the Public-Use Data File documented in  Woodhury et ml. 
(1987).  (3)  Sample sizes for the income  classes in the Control Croup and the 
Claimant Experiment can be seen in Table 10. 54 
Table 13 
The Frequency of  Recall in  Subsamples of the Missouri Data 
(1)  Total sample size  808 
(2)  Individuals recalled by 
their previous employer 
Number  413 
As  a percentage of total sample  51 
(3)  Individuals  using state 
employment service (ES) 
Number  468 
As a percentage of total sample  58 
(4)  Those using ES who are recalled 
by their previous employer 
Number  173 
As a percentage of those using ES  37 
(5)  Those using ES who have short 
unemployment spells (less 
than or  equal to 11 weeks) 
Number  206 
As a percentage of  those using ES 
(6)  Those using ES,  with short spells, 
who are recalled 
Number  99 
As a percentage of those using ES with short spells  48 
Note: The data for these calculations came from the  data set constructed by 
Coraort and Nicholson and documented in Corson and Hilton (1982).  Ihe data  era 
extenaively recoded aa indicated in  Katz and Meyer  (1988). Figure 1 
Income 
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